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Recent Developments 
United States v. Mason: 
The Fourth Circuit Clarified the Career Criminal Classification of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
I n United States v. Mason, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit clarified the career 
criminal classification of the federal 
sentencing guidelines. United 
States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th 
Cir. 2002). The court held a prior 
state conviction for unarmed 
ro bbery committed when Mason 
was a juvenile cannot be counted as 
a predicate offense for purposes of 
career offender sentencing. Id. at 
562. 
InApril 2000, JamesAnthony 
Mason ("Mason") pleaded guilty to 
illegal distribution of cocaine base. 
Mason's probation officer, on 
whom the court relied for a 
sentencing determination, assigned 
Mason a total offense level of 
twenty-nine, placing him in criminal 
history category VI. The probation 
officer's recommendation relied 
entirely on Section 4B 1.1 of the 
federal sentencing guidelines, 
which stipulates among other 
qualifications that a defendant have 
at least two prior felony convictions 
of either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense. In 
Mason's case, the probation 
officer's recommendation relied on 
a 1990 federal conviction for a 
controlled substance committed 
when Mason was twenty-six and a 
conviction for unarmed robbery 
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committed when Mason was a 
juvenile. 
Mason was sentenced to 151 
months in federal prison and three 
years of supervised release as a 
result of his category IV criminal 
history. Pr;ior to sentencing, Mason 
objected to the court's reliance on 
the juvenile conviction in determining 
career criminal classification. The 
district court overruled Mason's 
objection. Mason appealed. The 
Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de 
novo and vacated and remanded 
for new sentencing. 
In its evaluation, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
dissected Sections 4BI.l and4BI.2 
of the federal sentencing guidelines. 
Id. at 558. The court began with 
Section 4B 1, which sets forth 
requirements for the career criminal 
offender classification. The issue 
with regard to Mason lay with the 
third and final element of the 
classification, which states a 
"defendant has at least two prior 
felony convictions of either a crime 
of violence or a controlled sub-
stance offense." Id. The court 
agreed with Mason that the first 
felony conviction relied upon by the 
court was questionable because, 
although convicted as an adult, he 
received a juvenile sentence. Id. at 
559. 
The court, however, did not 
find the statute necessarily deter-
minative.ld. For further analysis, 
the court reviewed commentary to 
Rule 4B 1.2, which defines prior 
felony conviction as a prior adult 
federal or state conviction. Id. at 
559. As such, ajuvenile conviction 
cannot be counted in determining 
whether a defendant was a career 
offender. Id. 
The court acknowledged in its 
reading of Section 4 B 1.1 that the 
appropriate elements of criminal 
sentencing have typically been 
determined with reference to 
Section 4B 1.2. Id. at 559. How-
ever, the court found Section 
4A 1.2( d) provided potentially 
determinative information in this 
case. Id. Section 4A1.2(d) deals 
with whether offenses committed 
prior to age eighteen are included 
in the criminal history calculation. 
Id. The commentary clarifies that 
such offenses are counted only if the 
adult sentence exceeds one year 
and one month. Id. at 560. There-
fore, the court reasoned if the 
commentary was followed, Ma-
son'sjuvenile robbery conviction 
counted for purposes of career 
offender classification only ifhe was 
both convicted and sentenced as an 
adult.ld. at 560. 
The court examined whether 
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the commentary was inconsistent 
with the guidelines and, by relying 
on the rule's plain language, 
determined it was not. Id. at 560. 
The Commission used the word 
"imprisonment" in Section 4AI.I 
(1), which refers to adult convictions 
and sentencing. Id. The Commis-
sion then used the word "confine-
ment" in Section 4Al.I (2), which 
covers both juvenile and adult 
dispositions. Id. The court rea-
soned the Commission was delib-
erate in its wording of the rule. Id. 
The Commission used the harsher 
term "imprisonment" to refer to 
adult adjudication. It used the less 
harsh term "confinement" to refer to 
juvenile adjudication. Id. These 
terms were, therefore, intentionally 
used to indicate different criminal 
dispositions. Id. For Mason's juv-
enile conviction to count toward 
career offender purposes, he must 
have received an adult conviction 
and an adult sentence. Id. 
The court then analyzed 
whether Mason was both convicted 
and sentenced as an adult for his 
juvenile robbery offense. Id. at 560. 
. In making a determination, the court 
must, according to the rule, examine 
the sentencing and conviction guide-
lines ofthe particular jurisdiction 
where the defendant was adjudi-
cated. Id. Mason had been adjudi-
cated in West Virginia. Id. 
The court assumed for pur-
poses of its evaluation that Mason 
received an adult conviction. Id. A 
juvenile convicted under adult 
jurisdiction in West Virginia is not 
automatically sentenced as an adult. 
Id. at 561. Under West Virginia 
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code, a circuit court may remand a 
minor offender to juvenile juris-
diction after adjudication as an 
adult by sentencing the offender as 
a juvenile. Id. Mason was sen-
tenced as a juvenile under these 
guidelines since the judge sentenced 
him to placement in a rehabilitation 
center for youthful offenders. Id. 
Therefore, the court concluded 
Mason was sentenced as ajuvenile. 
Id. 
Mason's 1981 juvenile sen-
tence meant, therefore, his convict-
ion could not serve as a predicate 
felony under Section 4B 1.1. Id. at 
562. As such, Mason did not qualify 
for career offender status under the 
federal sentencing guidelines. Id 
As a footnote to its holding, 
the Fourth Circuit recognized its 
decision was not necessarily 
consistent with decisions in other 
circuits. Id. at 562. The court's 
holding, in this case, may be read 
as a liberal interpretation of the 
federal sentencing guidelines. The 
court did permit a three-time felon 
to avoid the strict career offender 
classification based on, what some 
might read as, a technicality. 
However, the Fourth Circuit follow-
ed the strictest reading ofthe rule. 
Federal sentencing guidelines do not 
permit courts to rely on juvenile 
felony offenses as predicate offenses 
for purposes of career offender sen-
tencing. With its Mason decision, 
the Fourth Circuit made a bold 
statement. If the Legislature desires 
a different interpretation, it must 
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